F-35 Sustainment Challenges Mount As Global Fleet Grows | Defense content from Aviation Week

What a surprise.

Lockheed-Martin promised that the F-35 would have support costs near that of the far smaller F-16, because of it's advanced logistics software.

Right now, it looks like it will cost more to operate than the twin engine F-15:

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This specific problem was resolved quickly, but that is not often the case. Across the F-35 enterprise, operators are struggling with severe maintenance challenges of which the most critical are a spare parts shortage, insufficient repair capacity and excessive glitches in the ALIS logistics system that tracks the health of the fleet. Meanwhile at the production level, suppliers and skilled workers are making mistakes that slow down the manufacturing process before a complete aircraft even comes off the line.

The sustainment challenges are emerging at a pivotal time for the program, with F-35 pilot training ramping up, international deliveries accelerating, and the Navy on track to achieve initial operational capability of its F-35Cs in 2019. As the global F-35 fleet is poised to triple by 2021, government and industry officials are facing mounting pressure to solve these challenges—and fast.

Reports emerged recently that the U.S. Air Force—the F-35’s single largest customer—would be forced to cut as many as 590 F-35s from the overall buy, or one-third of the force, if sustainment costs do not come down. The government-industry team must find a way to reduce operations and sustainment (O&S) costs or F-35 customers will have to make “tough decisions,” Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson said ominously during a recent event in Washington.

The Air Force is working with the JPO to reduce overall O&S costs by 38% over the next 10 years, or about $3.8 billion a year, Wilson says. And in the field, the Air Force aims to get the cost to sustain the F-35 down to that of sustaining a legacy F-16, according to Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein.

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The main F-35A training hubs, Luke and Eglin AFB, Florida, arguably are facing the most immediate challenge as the Air Force grapples with a critical pilot shortfall.

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But it is not just the training bases that are impacted by the spare parts problem. Overall from January through Aug. 7, 2017, F-35s were unable to fly because they were awaiting parts on average about 22% of the time—more than double the Pentagon’s goal of 10%, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

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ALIS, the maintenance hub of the F-35 enterprise, was designed to ease the burden on maintainers by increasing automation. But today the system, which is based on a 1995 architecture, actually is adding to their workload.

ALIS has an excessive rate of “false positives,” where the system mistakenly tells the maintainers a certain part is broken. Even more troubling, each service continues to rely heavily on contractor-provided information technology experts, rather than service personnel, to manipulate ALIS’s intricate software and complex databases, according to the subcommittee chairman, U.S. Rep. Mike Turner (R-Ohio).

In the field, maintainers must rely on inefficient workarounds and manual tracking processes when ALIS is not performing as it should, officials say. In some of the Air Force’s maintenance units, for example, airmen are assigned to tackle ALIS glitches as their primary job, says Harris, which was certainly not in the original plan.

(emphasis mine)


Lockheed-Martin developed a tightly integrated system as a way of maximizing their ability to lock in customers to their support services,



So you have a gargantuan mass of interdependent code, and fixing problems is like untying the Gordian knot.

The F-35 is never going to be as cheap to operate as an F-16, the JSF's MTOW is 65% more than the that of the F-16, but right now, it's simply too expensive to operate in significant numbers.

Gripen E Makes Maiden Flight

The upgraded Gripen, which is basically a completely new aircraft, jas just made its first flight:

Swedish aerospace and defense company Saab has completed the first flight of its prototype E-model Gripen fighter jet.

The prototype, coded 39-8, took to the air at 10:32 a.m. local time June 15 from the company’s development facility at Linkoping, flying for 40 min. and reaching an altitude of 13,000 ft. before touching down safely.

Video and imagery of the aircraft departing and inflight showed a relatively short takeoff run in dry power and revealed that the company retracted the landing gear inflight, a relatively rare occurrence in first flights. Two twin-seat JAS-39D Gripens acted as chase aircraft.

The aircraft took 10 years to develop, which by the standard of modern fighter development is a very short time, and while pricier than its it is still far cheaper to operate than its competitors.

Total employment on the program is less than that of just the program office for the F-35, and total development cost for the program was less than that of the most recent software release for the JSF. (link)

There is no reasonable justification for the protracted and expensive developments that have become the standard in western fighter programs.

Here is a PR video from Saab:

PICTURES: Saab rolls out first Gripen E fighter

Saab has rolled out its first Gripen NG, which structurally is pretty much a new plane.

As compared to the travails of the F-22, where upgrades and modernization have been expensive and difficult, and the F-35, which is late, expensive, under performing, and unreliable.

By comparison, all the major systems for the new Gripen have flown, the first aircraft is a production unit, and it is expected to start flight testing this year:

Saab is targeting the on-schedule delivery of its new Gripen E fighter to the Swedish and Brazilian air forces late this decade, as it steps up export campaigns involving both the advanced model and its earlier C/D-model jet.

The first of three Swedish test aircraft to be involved in the project was unveiled at the manufacturer’s Linköping facility on 18 May, in front of an international audience of current and prospective Gripen users.

Lead aircraft 39-8 will be handed over to Saab’s flight test department “this summer”, and should make its flight debut at the end of the year, the company says. It will be used initially to verify the general systems, airframe and aerodynamics of the evolved design, which – while visually resembling earlier iterations – is entirely new.

Powered by a GE Aviation F414 turbofan engine capable of generating 22,000lb (98kN) of thrust, the Gripen E has an empty weight of 8,000kg (17,600lb) and a maximum take-off weight of 16.5t. The latter represents a 2.5t increase over the C/D. At 15.2m (49.8ft), it is also 30cm longer than its predecessor, while its wingspan has increased by 20cm, to 8.6m. With 40% more internal fuel, the new model has increased range, payload and endurance, and features an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, other updated avionics and new electronic warfare equipment.

Saab chief executive Håkan Buskhe reveals the cost of developing the Gripen E and producing its three Swedish test aircraft will be less than $2 billion.

This is chump change by the standards of modern fighter development.

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Stressing that aircraft 39-8 is not a prototype, Ydreskog says: “Assembly of the first test aircraft – with 60,000, mostly new parts – was shorter than number 204 for the C/D.” The programme’s other test units are in different stages of structural assembly and only minor adjustments are expected as the shift to series production occurs. “There is some optimisation to do – we can reduce some weight,” he notes.

But Saab believes one of the biggest advances with the Gripen E comes through its use of an all-new integrated modular avionics system, which splits flight-critical and tactical management software. It says the latter’s software, hardware and algorithms can be rapidly changed – like apps on a smartphone – to keep pace with evolved operational requirements or technological advances in computing over the life of the type’s use.

(emphasis mine)

The updated software has been in development for far less time than the (still not up to snuff) avionics package for the F-35 JSF, and it will be trivial for countries using the aircraft.

The reason is that critical functions are segregated from one another, which, as any programmer can tell you, simply works better than tightly integrated all in one software as used in the JSF, even after billions of dollars have been spent.

Of course, for Lockheed Martin, their hairball of a software platform is not a bug, it's a feature, because it allows charge tolls on users who want to make upgrades.

As Aviation Week notes:

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Gripen E is scaled up from the early Gripen C/D with 40% additional fuel capacity, more thrust from its General Electric F414 engine and more weapon stations. Internally the aircraft has been given a new sensor suite, with active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and infrared search and track (IRST).

Key to the aircraft is a federated software system that separates critical flight control systems from the tactical systems. Saab claims this will make the Gripen E’s avionics and mission systems more easily and quickly upgradable. Just 10% of the aircraft’s system code will be devoted to flight-critical systems; the remaining 90% will be mission-system related. Saab officials say tactical upgrades could be tested and introduced in weeks rather than months.

(emphasis mine)

The direct operating cost, as well as the fly away cost, of the Gripen looks to be less than that of its competitors.

Compared to its competitors, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale, and the Lockheed-Martin Lightning II, this aircraft should better suit the needs of most countries out there, but Sweden lacks the connections behind the other platforms, so it looks likely that while it will be a market success, it will be a only a modest success.

This is a Feature, Not a Bug

It turns out that Lockheed-Martin and the Pentagon are adding insult to injury, and requiring that F-35 customers fund software upgrade laboratories, because these will be the only entities capable of maintaining the aircraft.

So in addition to everything else, the JSF will be a "forever" source of revenue for LM, while ensuring that foreign operators will never develop expertise necessary to be a competitor: (Paid subscription required):

Foreign air forces using the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are being compelled to build and fund $150 million software laboratories, based in the U.S. and almost 50% staffed by U.S. personnel, that generate data crucial to the fighter’s ability to identify new radio-frequency threats.

This regime is more stringent and far-reaching than earlier U.S. fighter export deals. Those usually withheld key software — known as source code — from the customer, but in most cases allowed local users to manage their own “threat libraries,” data that allowed the electronic warfare (EW) system to identify radio-frequency threats, with in-country, locally staffed facilities.

For the U.K. in particular, the reliance on U.S.-located laboratories looks like a pullback from its earlier position. In 2006, concern over access to JSF technology reached the national leadership level, and prompted a declaration, by U.S. President George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, that “both governments agree that the U.K. will have the ability to successfully operate, upgrade, employ, and maintain the JSF such that the U.K. retains operational sovereignty over the aircraft.”

That promise seemingly contrasts with the severe limits now being imposed on non-U.S. access to the system.

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Another source close to the U.K. user community notes that Lockheed Martin has advertised the capability of the “fusion engine” — the software that combines inputs from different sensors and datalinks — to identify targets and implement rules of engagement automatically. But if the logic of the fusion engine itself is not understood at the U.K.’s operational level, he says, “You can imagine that this slaughters our legal stance on a clear, unambiguous and sovereign kill chain.”

The restrictions are also likely to be cumbersome. By contrast, “Swedish air force Gripens are often updated between sorties,” a Saab spokesman says. Signals intercepted and recorded by the fighter’s EW system on one sortie can be analyzed and the system updated in hours.

If this sounds like incompetence, it's because you do not understand the goal of the program.

The goal is maintaining and extending US hegemony in the weapons market, so that they have money for overpaying retired generals as "consultants".

Why the Saab Gripen is different From the JSF

We don't care, we don't have to...we're the phone company.

While the customers of the F-35 are being shut out of its software, and are unable to integrate their own weapons systems, Saab is using its willingness to incorporate outside systems to make the platform more attractive:

A focus on realistic requirements has helped Swedish industry and government teams integrate weapons on the Gripen faster and at lower cost than similar efforts elsewhere, Saab says.

Two new weapons for the Gripen, the Raytheon GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II laser-plus-GPS bomb and Diehl Iris-T infrared air-to-air missile (AAM), were successfully integrated in 2006-09, according to Gideon Singer, technical director for Gripen exports, and Lisa Abom, head of the Saab project office for engineering and weapons. Flight testing of the Thales Digital Joint Reconnaissance Pod for South Africa's Gripens was completed in 2011 in “less than eight months,” they say.

The Gripen was also selected as the test platform for the MBDA Meteor AAM. The first production firing took place this summer and qualification firings for full integration of the Gripen will be complete in 2014. Sweden will be the first air force to field the new missile, with the Gripen MS 20 package in 2015. That upgrade will also include the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb.

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Saab devotes 14% of integration costs to planning and coordination, Singer and Albom told the Defense IQ International Fighter Conference here this month. One lesson is to “reach early agreement,” they said. This means defining and clearly interpreting requirements, limitations and the approach to testing. “You need to avoid terms like 'full envelope,'” Singer remarked. “If you ask, the operational pilot will often say that he doesn't need to go supersonic with three tanks and all these bombs.”

The JSF is such a huge program that they don't care, much like Ma Bell in the 1960s.

Lockheed, and the Pentagon, see the closed nature as a source of profit (for Lockheed), and as a way to preserve the industrial base and to freeze out foreign competition (for both), and as such, it will be an upgrade nightmare, even for the so-called "partners" in the program.

Canada Drops F-35

The news that Canada has decided to cancel its purchase of 65 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters is a stunner.

It's the first cancellation, and Canada is more than a customer, it is also one of the original 9 nations that formed the JSF consortium:

The F-35 jet fighter purchase, the most persistent thorn in the federal government’s side and the subject of a devastating auditor-general’s report last spring, is dead.

Faced with the imminent release of an audit by accountants KPMG that will push the total projected life-cycle costs of the aircraft above $30 billion, the operations committee of the federal Cabinet decided to scrap the controversial sole-source program and go back to the drawing board, a source familiar with the decision said.

This occurred after Chief of the Defence Staff Thomas Lawson, while en route overseas, was called back urgently to appear before the committee, the source said.

The decision is sure to have ripple effects around the world, as any reduction in the number of aircraft on order causes the price to go up for all the other buyers. Canada is one of nine F-35 consortium members, including the United States.

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Last spring, Ferguson ignited a political firestorm when he reported that the top-line cost cited by the Conservatives in the 2011 election campaign — $9 billion for 65 planes, or $15 billion including maintenance and other life-cycle costs — was $10-billion below the Defence Department’s internal estimate.

Even the internal figure of $25.1 billion was suspect, critics said, because it assumed a 20-year life cycle. The longevity of the Lockheed-Martin-built aircraft, according to the Pentagon, is 36 years.

KPMG’s audit, due out next week, has confirmed the contention, long made by critics such as former assistant deputy minister (materiel) Alan Williams, that the F-35 program’s real cost would be much higher than any previously stated government estimate, sources say.

H/t Christina Mackenzie at the Ares blog.

Understand also that the KPMG analysis almost certainly ignored the elephant in the room, the fact that for any nation operating the F-35, they will be opening themselves up to potentially extortionate charges for support from from the prime contractor over the life of the program, because of the highly integrated, and completely closed, architecture of the aircraft:

It is not often that governments are afforded the luxury of looking into the future before they irrevocably commit to a course of action that will have momentous long-term consequences.

Yet, this is just what the debate about the future of Britain’s fleet of Apache attack helicopters provides, not just to its own government, but also to other European governments as they prepare to order, at great cost, the US-made F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Britain’s problem is that it operates the AH-64D Longbow version of Apache, while the US Army is upgrading to the AH-64E Block III version. This means that “essential technical support for the British Apache fleet will be withdrawn from 2017,” as the Daily Telegraph reported Dec. 5, leaving Britain with the choice of either upgrading all or part of its Apaches to the new version, or retiring them after 2017 as they drift into early obsolescence.

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Whether they realize it or not when they buy a US-made weapon, that is how the system works: US forces only support the weapons they operate, so it’s either keep up or drop out, and in this case either scrap your weapons or see them fade away into technical and operational irrelevance.

The other side of the coin, obviously, is that buyers of US weapons are always assured of having access to the very latest versions, improvements and upgrades decided by the US military.

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Each time the US military decides a modification or upgrade to its F-35s, foreign customers will have to follow suit, at whatever cost Lockheed and the Pentagon decide, or else see their aircraft become obsolete as US technical support shifts to the newer version.

In fact, the situation will be infinitely more serious in the case of the F-35, as export customers will not have access to the aircraft’s source codes, nor to its more advanced maintenance methods and equipment, because all but the most basic maintenance will be carried out by Lockheed Martin in its own facilities in the United States.

Foreign operators of the F-35 will have to pay to play. But it is probable that European governments do not fully understand this consequence of buying into a major US program.

European buyers of the F-16 in the 1970s – which now all intend to buy the F-35 - were not faced with a similar situation because they had assembled their F-16s in Europe; because software source codes were not an issue at the time; and because the United States had a vested interest in keeping allies’ fighters as effective as possible during the Cold War, when profits took a back seat. None of these circumstances exist today.

Unlike the case of the UK's AH-64Ds, the architecture of the JSF is such that if you opt out of the upgrade, and Lockheed will stops supporting that model of the aircraft, you won't simply have an aircraft that is obsolete or obsolescent, you will have an aircraft which cannot fly, because the customer will not be allowed to have tools to maintain it.

Your $100 million dollar aircraft has become a door stop.

As an aside, one wonders whether there is will be an "off switch" on export models of the F-35.

Certainly, if I were directing foreign military sales at the Pentagon, I would demand such a feature, at least for those aircraft shipped to non NATO allies.

This is the Real Goal of the JSF Program

Norway is saying that it will not commit to buying F-35s unless it gets a formal commitment to integrate Kongsberg joint strike missile (JSM):

Norway's Kongsberg has warned that the country needs a commitment from the US government within six months to integrate a national-specific missile on the Lockheed Martin F-35, or it could withdraw from the programme.

So far, Norway has received no assurance that the Kongsberg joint strike missile (JSM) will be integrated as part of the Block 4 software update on the F-35 in 2019.

The absence of such a commitment could prompt the Norwegian parliament to reject an expected request early next year from the nation's defence ministry to buy the first four F-35s, in order to launch training activities in 2016.

"That is what I think is the critical issue [for the parliament's decision]", said Bjorne Bjune, Kongsberg vice president of business development, speaking at the Air Force Association's annual convention in Washington DC on 20 September. "That decision needs to be forthcoming."

Integrating the JSM as the Norwegian F-35's primary surface-to-air missile system killer is considered an absolute requirement by Oslo, Bjune said. Norway has already invested $1 billion to adapt the naval strike missile into the air-launched JSM, and is planning to spend a further $200 million.

One of the unspoken goals of the JSF program, from the American perspective, is to kneecap the development of systems related to the JSF, either by not allowing integration of foreign systems into the aircraft's (very) closed architecture, or by making it prohibitively expensive.

The problems that are occurring now, when Lockheed and the Pentagon are trying to convince allies to purchase the aircraft, are nothing compared to what we will see once the planes start to enter other inventories.

Simply put, once your country commits to purchasing the JSF, you will find nothing but delays, stonewalling, and excessive costs if you want to integrate, or update, an indigenous system into your fleet.

It's Not Just the B Model F-35

Yes, the F-35B, the STOVL variant has been placed on probation, but the entire program is encountering difficulties.

Most recently it has been revealed that there are problems with the aerodynamics and propulsion for all the models:

Flight testing so far has revealed problems with handling in the transonic and medium angle-of-attack regimes, [reportedly problems with wing drop/sideslip akin to those discovered in flight test for the F/A-18 E/F] and a problem with screech - destructive high-frequency combustion instability in the F135 afterburner - which is preventing the aircraft from achieving maximum power. [Which produces shockwaves, think the "snapping" on a an improperly lit Bunsen burner, writ large]

You know, that alternate engine for the F-35 is starting to look a lot better, huh.

Additionally, there are very real continuing problems with software, with the advanced helmet mounted displays and the vaunted 360° sensor fusiuon for the pilot not working properly.

As to the B model, weight problems is literally a killer.

With conventional and carrier launched variants, weight gain cuts into performance, payload, and range, but with STOVL aircraft, it means that they are simply unable to perform their basic functions:

Gates said that solving the unspecified technical issues now afflicting the aircraft "could" add cost and weight; the program office says that it "will", and that it will take two years to "engineer solutions ... and assess their impact."

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Vertical landing is a nonvariable requirement. The required airspeed is zero and can't be adjusted by a few knots to compensate for extra weight. The JSF key performance parameter for bring-back load - corresponding to two 1,000-pound JDAMs and two Amraams - was set early on at a minimal level.

One reason that Lockheed Martin's shaft-driven lift fan (SDLF) concept was a winner in 1996 and 2001 was that it seemed to offer thrust margin for vertical landing. At the start of SDD, the F-35B was projected to have an empty weight of 29,700 pounds - not a bad place to be in with (then) almost 40,000 pounds of vertical thrust. But, in the weight crisis of 2004, engineers found that the jet had ballooned to a far higher figure (never actually published) at which it could not land vertically with normal fuel reserves, let alone weapons.

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Still, the redesign left a fundamental problem: the bring-back load (around 3,000 pounds) was only 8 percent of the landing weight. The result is that the F-35B couldn't tolerate any OEW growth or thrust shortfall. The engine and transmission are maxed: that's the issue underlying the repeated delays in powered-lift testing, chronicled here and here.

This is a mess, and much of it is driven by unrealistic requirements for commonality, and placing too much emphasis on the STOVL version, which wastes weight on the A and C variants.

When I worked on the now FCS, it was clear to everyone working on the program that the commonality requirements made the systems more expensive and less combat effective, and the same thing is happening with the F-35.

The F-35 JSF Clusterf%$# Gets Even Clusterf%$#ier

Yes, everyone's favorite too big to fail defense program fails once again, with reports that SecDef Robert Gates has been briefed that costs will further escalate, and there will be an additional 3 year delay:

Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Pentagon’s costliest program, may see more price increases and new schedule delays of as much as three years, two government officials familiar with the matter said.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates is scheduled to be briefed tomorrow on new cost and schedule assessments for the F-35 and other aircraft, said the officials, who requested anonymity because details aren’t public. Software, engineering and flight difficulties are greater than expected, the officials said.

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Slippage in the JSF’s timetable may be as much as one year for the Air Force and Navy versions and two to three years for development of the Marine Corps model capable of short takeoffs and landings, the officials said.

It should be noted that these delays were forecast by the Pentagon's Joint Estimating Team (JET) over two years ago, and much of the delays are software issues.

Even Lockheed's CEO admits this, while asking for more money (big surprise).

What's more, not only will it be delayed and not only will the acquisition costs rise, but direct operating costs are jumping as well:

Gates also was advised in a Nov. 2 briefing that operations and support costs for the F-35 will be re-budgeted at 1.5 times the aircraft it replaces, more than twice the original goal and 50% more than more recent projections, according to reports.

Eric Palmer runs some numbers and shows that there has been about a 3 year of push-back on the schedule over the past 3 years, so basically the program is running in place.

What a damn mess.

Death Spiral, JSF Edition, Chapter 2 of Many

Well, this week, SecDef Robert Gates has just fired the program manager for the JSF program, Major General David Heinz, and is withholding millions of dollars in performance fees to the prime contractor, Lockheed-Martin, because of schedule and budget slips, citing a "troubling performance record." (see also here, here, and here)

Lockheed-Martin's response has been nothing short of delusional, at least as described by Steve O'Bryan, L-M VP for "business development and customer engagement" for the JSF, ":

Gates' actions, in O'Bryan's view, "reflected the commitment of the U.S. government to the F-35... the program is fully funded, with more development funding and more robust leadership." The decision shows that the aircraft is "relevant today, and that the customer wants the jet right now."

I'm beginning to think that part of the reason that this program is over budget and behind schedule is that Lockheed Martin has, and so the tax payer is paying for, a, "vice president for business development and customer engagement on the JSF program".

It seems to me that this is a rather high falutin, and likely highly paid, position for what amounts to a PR flack with heavy duty knee pads.

Misapplication of resources may be a part of the problem, and Mr. O'Bryan's continued employment does not seem to me to be an example of "spending smart."

Of course, the USAF chief of staff is similarly sanguine, suggesting that the delays in the pro will only raise unit cost in the immediate term, because, like no other program before it, the delays will increast the cost only, "for a period," and he does not see a Nunn-McCurdy breach in the costs.

It makes me want to quote that Samuel L. Jackson speech from Pulp Fiction again, because it's clear that they want to f%$# the taxpayer like a bitch.

There are people who recognize the truth, like the Director Of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), who says that even with a flawless program, there will be a slippage of at least 18 months on the program, but that a flawless program is extremely unlikely, since things like the idea that modeling and simulation can reduce testing are unlikely to succeed.

Of note in the DOT&E report:

• LRIP configuration is not yet defined.
• Clutch heating on the STOVL variant
• Increases in weight and landing speeds means that tires are running into their thermal limits for the carrier (F-35C) version.
• Software instability
• They aircraft is pulling out many of its survivability features, fuel check valves in the engine nozzle and fire extinguishers, to reach the specified weight.

Additionally, it now appears that the F-35C fuselage is under-strength:

Lockheed Martin Corp. is fixing a structural weakness in the Navy version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter that limits the jet’s ability to launch from aircraft carriers, according to a company spokesman.

Engineers in July discovered a “strength shortfall” in an aluminum structure in the aircraft’s center fuselage that helps absorb stresses during a catapult takeoff, Lockheed spokesman John Kent said today in an e-mailed statement.

Additionally, it appears that the carrier model may be too hot, literally for carrier decks:

The Pentagon’s Gilmore said in his report that the engine and power-systems’ exhaust on the Navy and Marine versions is powerful enough to pose a threat to carrier personnel. The blasts also may damage shields used to deflect heat on the deck, including on the CVN-21 carrier, the Navy’s most expensive warship.

“Early analyses of findings indicate that integration of the F-35 into the CVN-21 will result in damage to the carrier deck environment and will adversely affect hangar deck operations,” Gilmore wrote.

<snark>Actually, it's not a worry, since their new electromagnetic catapults don't work anyway. </snark>

Special Software Gives JSF 50% Lethality Boost for JSF

Unfortunately, as Bill Sweetman laments, the software in question is:

While we're going back and forth about the supposed sixfold advantage of the JSF over anything except the F-22, see this from a year ago:

"U.S. Air Force analyses show the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II is at least 400 percent more effective in air-to-air combat capability than the best fighters currently available in the international market."

And now it's 600 per cent. This does of course prove convincingly that Lockheed Martin is right to suggest that the F-35's capability will be able to be vastly improved through software alone.

That software being, in this case, PowerPoint.

...

(emphasis mine)

Mr. Sweetman owes me a screen wipe.

Israel May Drop JSF

So, we now have a report that Israel may order the semi-stealthy "Silent Eagle" if it does not get technical data on the computer for the F-35 JSF.

The claim is that they need to be able to repair the systems under combat conditions, but the counter claim by the US that they will have sufficient spares to swap them out seems to be convincing to me, so I think that there may be other issues.

First is the price. With an order of 75 aircraft, and a price of up to $20 billion, the cost of the aircraft is $266 million each (!), and that is simply not affordable.

Heck, the good old USA can't afford more F-22s at a mere (!) 185 million each.

More significant, however, is that without this access, the Israelis will be unable to qualify their own systems on the aircraft.

This means that they cannot configure their own weapons, or their own avionics in such a system, means that, for example, they could not make adjustments to the AESA radar in order to jam some new sensor that was fielded, or install a dedicated jamming system on the aircraft.

I think that idea that they would be at the mercy of Lockheed-Martin for timely software upgrades to counter a new weapons system that the Russians or Chinese ship to the Syrians scares the hell out of the IAF.

The KC-X Tanker, The Musical

It appears that we've got our first astroturf, Tankerblog.com, which has been anonymously registered, where they brethlessly reveal that A330 tanker cannot refuel the V-22, while the 767 could.

The blog describes itself as, "The blog is moderated by Mike Reilly who spends his days at the Center for Security Policy and a bipartisan group of legislative assistants who spend their days, and most nights, working on Capitol Hill."

These "staffers" are from the Seattle no doubt, and the CSP has among it members, Richard Perle, Douglas J. Feith, , Frank Gaffney - Project for the New American Century, Monica Crowley and , Laura Ingraham. (You can get a line on their right wing nut supporters here)

No reasons given for why the difference, and in the real world, if refueling were needed it would be done by a KC-130 turboprop, since using a jet to refuel a turboprop that has to operate below 15k feet because it is not pressurized is just nuts.

A bit of humor at this "blog" though, they have a poll on whether congress should stop the deal, and the pro EADS sides in winning.Tanker War Blog, unnamed bipartasin staffers in congress, from Washington state, no doubt. http://tankerblog.blogspot.com/ look at their poll...good yucks.

The kicker is that Northrop Grumman says it can refuel the V-22, "said on Monday its aerial tanker based on the Airbus A330 could refuel the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft flown by the Marine Corps."

Nice to see some defense procurement related humor.

In the meantime, we are starting to see people worrying that Congress will go xenophobic, and queer the contract which would threaten weapons sales in Europe. *cough* JSF *cough*

As to what Boeing is arguing about, it appears that a lot of this is the spacing between wingtips while parked. The USAF reduced this on the basis of what had actually observed.

Additionally, Boeing complained that the Combined Mating and Ranging Planning System (Cmarps) system which was used to develop operational scenarios for the bidding, was something that NG was more familiar with, but seeing as how the software is over 20 years old, I think that this is more another example of how Boeing was being petulant in the bid process.

Aviation Week (subscription required) also lists the following issues:

• The Air Force added a "receptacle credit" for the capability of receiving as well as offloading fuel. Should have been there from the start, but it's a clearly a positive capability.
• Changed its assessment of the pavement thickness/strength at airports used in the mission modeling, allowing more A330s to be parked.
• There was a change in ground turnaround time, which was then, "fixed for both competitors at 4 hr., 15 min.

For what it's worth, Airbus tanker is already in test, see picture:


There are 767 tankers flying, but they are substantially different from what was pitched to the USAF.

Pentagon Support for Useless, Overprices Boondoggle Gains Strength

Yes, after years of lobbying, it looks like the Pentagon may support buying more F-22s.

It's expensive, it's designed for use against the non-existent Warsaw Pact, it has no advantages in a counter-insurgency campaign, and it is highly limited (the JSF is a far better bomb truck).

Additionally, any new production will have to update computer hardware and software, because the original architecture is obsolete.

Yet another indication that the USAF should be reintegrated into the Army. This is a toy for the wild blue yonder set.

F-35 JSF Problems Worse Than Reported

I was already aware that that flight testing had been suspended after a power system glitch, but was under the impression that this was a temporary flaw that did not effect flying characteristics, though it did lead to an emergency landing, as any major system dropout, no matter how short, should during testing.

After a series of 7 quite successful flights, the test flight program stops in February 2007 to fix some minor problems in the JSF flight control software. This is not unusual in the early stages of a test flight program. In March 2007, the JSF returns to flight status and takes off for the first supersonic flight. At the end of April the JSF prototype AA-1 takes off several times a week. But then, destiny strikes. On May 3, 2007 with the second test pilot Jeff Knowles at the stick, a serious malfunction hits the JSF. At 38,000 feet (12 km) level flight and at a speed of some 800 km/hour, the plane executed a planned, 360-degree roll but experienced power loss in the electrical system about halfway through the manoeuvre.

In an emergency procedure, power is restored and Jeff Knowles regains control of the plane. The pilot cuts short this 19th test flight and makes an emergency landing in Fort Worth, TX. Due to control problems with right wing flaperons, the JSF has to make that landing at an exceptional high speed of 220 knots (350 km/hr). The plane's undercarriage, brakes and tires are damaged. The plane is stopped, surrounded by emergency vehicles, and towed away, but several eyewitnesses take pictures of the emergency landing.

This is not a glitch that does not affect flying characteristics. This a dangerous landing and the risk of loss of airframe and pilot.

Additionally, the power supply for the aircraft is about only 65% of necessary power, which, given that the F-35 has a power by wire setup on its control surface actuators means much more than just the radar or displays dropping out, it means potential loss of control.

Additionally, to save money, they want to cancel two of the test aircraft, and eliminate about 15% of the test flights. The excuse is that simulation will handle it, but more reasonably, this is budget games, because if problems are discovered on a fielded system, Congress is over a barrel to protect pilots already flying the aircraft.

Saab, manufacturer of the Gripen, which should be available with a similar sensor suite shortly, though not the same stealth or apyload/range performance is saying that its operating costs will be about 2/3 of the JSF (believable, considering that it is about 1/2 the size), so it becomes a compelling alternative...A MirageIII/V of this generation, if you will.

Considering that the Typhoon, Rafale, and Gripen are all fielded, it is unlikely that they will experience significant price increases (Gripen excepted if they do a growth version), and in the long run will likely be much cheaper.