This is the Basic Model of Brokerages and Retail Investing

The LA Times has a story on retail currency trading, and how it's basically an excuse for financial firms to fleece retail investors:

An estimated 615,000 Americans are dabbling in foreign currency trading, encouraged by advertising from the two biggest U.S. brokers, FXCM Inc. and Gain Capital Holdings Inc., both based in New York.

Combined, FXCM and Gain have about 260,000 accounts, a third of them in the U.S.

These customers are losing money in spectacular fashion.

At FXCM, 75% to 77% of customers lost money each quarter last year, according to newly required disclosures to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. At Gain, which operates through http://www.forex.com, the number of unprofitable customers hovered between 72% and 79% every quarter last year, according to its filing.

…………


More commonly, however, it's the customers who lose out on these transactions, despite required disclosure statements that warn investors: "Your dealer is your trading partner, which is a direct conflict of interest."

Gain ended up making an average of $2,913 from every active trader it had last year, even though the average customer account contained only $3,000, according to the company's financial data.

FXCM made $2,641 for every active trader, while the average customer had $3,658.

(emphasis mine)

So, not only is your broker not acting in your best interest, he is actually actively attempting to f%$# you.

So the game is rigged against the small retail investor, right?


Wrong.

It's rigged against everyone, big or small.

The recent suit against JP Morgan Chase makes that clear:

New documents unsealed recently in a class-action lawsuit against JPMorgan Chase — some of which name Mr. Dimon, the chief executive — paint yet another picture of a bank profiting while its clients suffer. At issue is a precrash investment vehicle, named Sigma, in which the bank had invested $500 million in assets from pension funds and other clients, nearly all of which the clients say was lost when the investment tanked in 2008.

The clients were blindsided because they believed that Sigma was a safe way to invest. JPMorgan was not taken by surprise. As Louise Story reported in The Times on Monday, court documents show that warnings by top bank officials about Sigma and similar investments went all the way up to Mr. Dimon’s office.

The gist of the warnings was not how to protect clients, but how the ailing Sigma presented the bank with what one e-mail described as “very big moneymaking opportunities as the market deteriorates.”

When Sigma did indeed collapse, JPMorgan collected nearly $1.9 billion, according to the suit, a figure the bank disputes, without providing any alternative figure.

Let's be clear here: Even if this behavior was legal, and in the regulatory environment pre (and possibly post) Dodd-Frank, there is a non-zero chance that it was, this is clearly something that rates a criminal investigation, and if any violations are found, even if they are only tangential to the transaction, they should be pursued aggressively.

Fundamentally, when fraud goes unpunished, it creates an environment where fraud becomes the norm, and Wall Street is crooked to its core.