Maybe They Don't Like the Roach Motel Model of Defense Procurement

Lockheed-Martin's F-35 Business Model

It appears that Lockheed-Martin has been removed from the running for the US Navy's next generation fighter.

My guess would be is that the US Navy has not been satisfied with the F-35, and I don't think that it has much to do with aerodynamic performance, but the fact that Lockheed developed a system where it is impossible for a military service to operate the aircraft on its own.

There is a web of IP and software that requires the aircraft to phone home on a daily basis, and much of the work can only be done by L-M, all while the defense contractor collects its vig.

This sucks for the taxpayer, but it sucks even worse for the Navy, where they may be operating in the middle of nowhere, and they have to wait for an overpriced Lockheed technician to fly out to fix this.

This is a John Deere tractor on an aircraft carrier 1000 miles from land. 

I would note that this is just supposition on my part, but it seems to me to be the most likely reason for this decision, particularly since Lockheed still appears to be in the running for the USAF's next fighter aircraft:

Lockheed Martin is out of the running for the Navy’s sixth-generation fighter jet program, known as Next Generation Air Dominance or F/A-XX, Breaking Defense has learned.

A source with knowledge of the program told Breaking Defense that Lockheed submitted a bid to the Navy, but the proposal did not satisfy the service’s criteria. The company is now no longer proceeding with the bid. The Navy previously told Breaking Defense in November that the service was evaluating proposals, but it is unclear when Lockheed was knocked out of the competition. 

………

Lockheed, which cornered the market on fifth-generation fighters through its ubiquitous F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the F-22 Raptor, still has a shot to build a sixth-generation jet through the Air Force’s separate fighter competition, also known as Next Generation Air Dominance, where the company is facing off against Boeing. 

It is possible that the Navy lacked confidence in L-M's ability to smoothly integrate their new aircraft onto a carrier deck, there were problems with both the F-35 and the S-3 in this regard.

Given the history of Boeing (McDonnell-Douglas) and Northrop (Grumman), the USN may be more confident in the ability of these companies to execute, but given the stress that the Navy is placing on open architecture, my guess is that operational autonomy is what is driving this decision.

Still Cannot Build Planes

The Front Fell OffBoeing has had to halt certification testing for the B777-9 because, the engines might fall off.

As Anna Russel would say, "I'm not making this up, you know."

Boeing says it has halted certification flight testing of the 777-9 following the failure of a thrust link mounting component attached to one of the two GE Aerospace GE9X engines powering a test aircraft.

The discovery was made during post-flight inspections of the third test aircraft, WH003, following its return to Kailua-Kona, Hawaii, from a 5 hr. 31 min. certification test flight over the Pacific. Boeing says “during scheduled maintenance, we identified a component that did not perform as designed. Our team is replacing the part and capturing any learnings from the component and will resume flight testing when ready.”

The failure of the component, which was first reported by The Air Current, comes just as Boeing was accelerating into the first phase of 777-9 type inspection authorization (TIA), FAA-required testing for certification. Formal TIA tests began July 12 after a delay of almost three years and represent the last major milestone before anticipated FAA approval and initial deliveries—still currently scheduled for late 2025.

There are two fail-safe thrust links on each engine for redundancy and are designed to transfer vertical and lateral mechanical stresses between the engine and the aircraft. The Boeing-designed thrust links attach to the fan frame and carry mechanical loads—as well as engine torque about the engine axis and thrust—to the aft engine mount at the rear.

Company sources confirm the accuracy of reports that one of the links was severed, and that subsequent inspections on the other two active test aircraft, WH001 and WH002, have revealed cracks. Both of these aircraft are currently in lay-up undergoing scheduled maintenance at Boeing sites in Everett and Boeing Field, Seattle, respectively.

This is not normal for an aviation firm.

The suits have been eating their seed corn at Boeing ever since McDonnell took it over with Boeing's money.

It looks like there is nothing left here but executive stock options.

Still Can't Build Planes

It looks like there may be loose bolts floating around the rudder mechanisms of Boeing 737 MAX aircraft.

This is not a surprise.  One of the MBA "Innovations" introduced by Boeing since its merger with McDonnell is the wholesale elimination of safety inspectors.

This happening was both predictable and predicted:

Boeing is asking airlines to inspect its 737 Max jets for a potential loose bolt in the rudder control system, the airplane maker and Federal Aviation Administration confirmed this week.

The FAA said it would be “closely monitoring” the targeted inspections. The agency said Thursday that Boeing issued its inspection guidance to airlines after an international operator found a bolt with a missing nut during routine maintenance. In a separate case, Boeing also discovered an undelivered aircraft that had a nut that was not properly tightened.

“The issue identified on the particular airplane has been remedied,” the Arlington, Virginia, company told The Associated Press on Friday. “Out of an abundance of caution, we are recommending operators inspect their 737 MAX airplanes and inform us of any findings.”

Next time I fly, it's Airbus, or Embraer, or Comac, or Joe's Bar and Grill.

If it's Boeing, I ain't going.

Still Can't Make Planes

Boeing has been forced to expand inspections and slow production of its 737 MAX as its pressure bulkhead defects problems metastasizes.

This is what happens when you let the finance guys run things:

Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems have expanded the scope of their ongoing inspections of a production defect affecting 737 Max 8 aircraft, Boeing said on Thursday.

The planemaker in August identified a new quality problem with its popular 737 MAX aircraft involving supplier Spirit that resulted in improperly drilled holes on the aft pressure bulkhead made using an automated drill. Boeing has expanded inspections to include hand-drilled holes, according to trade publication The Air Current, which first reported the problem.

"We continue to take the time necessary to ensure each airplane meets our standards and regulatory requirements prior to ticketing and delivery," Boeing said in a statement.

The company declined to comment further on the scope of the latest issue or whether it will be able to meet its 737 delivery target of at least 400 jets in 2023, citing the quiet period before it announces its earnings on Oct. 25.

Boeing notified the Federal Aviation Administration of its initial findings earlier this week, along with customers already facing delivery delays of 737 Max 8s, according to The Air Current.

I will never forgive the Clinton administration for arm twisting Boeing into merging with McDonnell in the 1990s.

The subsequent takeover of Boeing by McDonnell executives, most infamously Harry Stonesphincter has basically destroyed the company.

Still Can't Make Planes

Boeing again, and it appears that, despite months of effort the timelines for certifying the latest 737 models have slipped again.

This is what happens when you let finance types run things:

FAA approval of the last two Boeing 737 MAX variants is “progressing,” a top Boeing official said, but ongoing challenges related to the agency’s more stringent approach to certification continue to lengthen the timelines.

“We do expect certification and delivery this year” of the 737-7, Boeing CFO Brian West said at a Bank of America investor event March 22. “We are working very, very closely with Southwest to make sure that we could help them with their fleet management and how that’s all going to play out for the course of this year. So, no specifics, but it’s progressing.”

Southwest, the largest 737-7 customer with 186 on order, once expected deliveries to start in early 2022. But the prolonged certification process has forced it to shift gears, removing the 737-7 from its 2023 network plan and keeping some older 737-700s once tagged for retirement in the process.

………

Boeing, which steers clear of predicting when FAA approvals for any of its projects will come, wrapped up 737-7 certification flight testing in late 2021. The remaining issues focus on validating pilot-reaction assumptions Boeing has made as part of system safety assessments (SSAs), industry sources with knowledge of the situation told Aviation Week. Boeing has been working on the SSAs for months, in some cases following FAA’s direction to provide more information or revisions.

“They have to validate their assumptions about pilot responses,” one source with certification experience told Aviation Week, pointing to internal shortcomings as part of Boeing’s issues. “When they were developing the 777 [in the early 1990s], they were the gold standard. You asked for documentation of anything, and they had it for you in a heartbeat. Everything was organized and well documented. That’s no longer true, and that’s part of why they’re struggling right now.”

This is what happened when the Clinton administration strong-armed Boeing into buying McDonnel Douglas.  The McDonnell Mafia took over, and their attitude has always been, "Aircraft, schmaircraft, we have stock buybacks to make."

If aliens were to abduct the entirety of the Harvard Business School, the world would be a better place.

Still Cannot Make Planes, and They Don’t Want To

Boeing is considering cancelling its 737 MAX 7 & 10 because they do not want to pay to fix them properly.

Basically, in response to the 737 MAX crashes, the a law was passed to require improvement in cockpit displays, but there was a grandfather period that ends at the end of this year.

Boeing does not want to fix this, because it costs money, and because it might require more extensive pilot retraining, so they are considering throwing in the towel on these two models:

Boeing may terminate the 737 MAX 7 program if the deadline for a cockpit warning system is not extended, blocking certification.

CEO David Calhoun previously said the 737 MAX 10 program might be certified.

In a federal filing of the 10Q quarterly report today, Boeing added that the MAX 7’s future is in doubt.

“If the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act (ACSAA) deadline is not amended [beyond Dec. 27 this year] and we otherwise fail to achieve certification, we might choose to discontinue the MAX 7 and/or MAX 10, resulting in future earnings charges and other financial impacts. We may be able to partially mitigate some of these financial impacts to the extent that customers exercise substitution rights into MAX 8 and/or MAX 9 aircraft,” Boeing wrote in its 10Q.

Certification targets

“The 737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 models are currently going through Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification activities. We are following the lead of the FAA as we work through the certification process, and currently expect the 737 MAX 7 to be certified in 2022 or 2023 and enter service in 2023, and the 737 MAX 10 to begin FAA certification flight testing in 2022 or 2023 and enter service in 2023 or 2024,” Boeing wrote.

“However, Section 116 of the December 2020 ACSAA prohibits the FAA from issuing a type certificate to aircraft after December 27, 2022, unless the aircraft’s flight crew alerting system meets certain specifications. With safety as our primary focus, we continue to work to meet all current regulatory requirements to support certification and are also engaged in discussions with stakeholders concerning a possible extension to the ACSAA’s December 27, 2022, deadline.”

This is what happens when the finance types take over from engineers.

Boeing is in a McDonnell style death spiral.

Boeing is F%$#ed

Richard Aboulafia has an essay on Boeing's chances to continue to manufacture civil airliners, and his characterization is very grim.

He calls the upcoming year, "Crucial," for Boeing, but what he describes is a course of action that the embattled aviation conglomerate has neither the will nor the technical resources to execute.

Boeing has become McDonnell, a company run by financial types into the ground, before McDonnell took over Boeing with Boeing's money in 1997:

Perhaps the biggest question in the aviation industry today is whether Boeing will create a new jet, specifically a midmarket one. The market clearly wants a new product in this class, and the company clearly needs one to compete against Airbus. But an examination of both the company and the market indicates that time is of the essence.

First, the market. The middle of the market—200-250-seat jets with 4,000-5,000-nm range—is easily the healthiest part of the industry in terms of orders. The orderbook for the Airbus A321neo—4,079 jets—is now the same size as Boeing’s entire MAX orderbook (686 delivered plus 3,405 on backlog, after ASC606 accounting adjustments). Notably, Airbus received 667 A321neo orders in 2020-21, when orders otherwise collapsed, and more than 1,000 in the last three years. While Boeing’s MAX 10 had a few good orders in 2021, the A321neo appears to be ahead of Boeing’s largest single-aisle jet by at least seven to one.

………

Second, there is Boeing’s ability to create a new jet and the broader context of workforce trends. Boeing last launched an all-new jet, the 787, in 2004. This 18-year gap is a record in Boeing’s history. Boeing Commercial Airplanes’ (BCA) independent R&D funding fell 30% in 2020 from 2019, and it fell 21% in 2021 from 2020 (see chart). Boeing says this key metric will start to grow again this year.

But if they spend more on R&D, then the return on investment drops, which means that bonuses and stock options for senior management drops, so management will not engage in a meaningful increase in R&D.

While engineering headcount did not fall precisely in line with these cuts, it has fallen markedly. Between early 2020 and mid-2021, BCA lost roughly 18% of its engineering and technical workforce, according to Bloomberg, following serious cuts in the previous decade. Here again, Boeing says it is starting to hire engineers; this is another measure to watch in 2022.

When, or if, Boeing does launch a new jet, it will be difficult to restore its engineering staff, thanks to inflationary salary trends. A very strong tech sector is paying very high salaries. SpaceX and other new space ventures are hiring aggressively, as are many well-funded advanced air mobility startups.

Boeing has been eating its seed corn for years, cutting its engineering capabilities, its manufacturing capabilities, etc.

As I have said before, they can no longer build aircraft.

The good news for Boeing is that the very same airlines and lessors that are eagerly ordering A321neos—and other financiers—would cheer a new Boeing midmarket jet and provide hundreds of up-front orders. Boeing also has a history of arriving late to a segment with a winning jet, as with the 777 (after the MD-11 and A330/340) and 787 (after the A330-200). With the right jet, Boeing could even recover its lost position as the world’s biggest jetliner company.

Mitigating against a new Boeing airliner is the company’s difficult financial state: It has $16.2 billion in cash but $58.1 billion in debt. There are few doubts about Boeing’s ability to access additional cash through debt or equity, though. And in the broader context, starting a new program with $500 million per year, say, in incremental spending would not make a serious difference to the company’s financial position.

Only, regulatory officials now know that Boeing lied to them with the 737MAX, that the 787 is still coming off the line needing extensive rework, and there are not many people at the company who could execute the development of a new aircraft. 

They are screwed.

Turn About is Fair Play

Russia is now implying that it might deploy troops and weapons to Cuba and Venezuela in response to the current diplomatic deadlock in the Ukraine.

If you find it alarming that Russian troops, and potentially missiles, even conventional ones, as little as 1800 km from Washington, DC, imagine how the Russians feel about American troops and weapons located 750 km from Moscow:

Russia has refused to rule out a military deployment to Cuba and Venezuela if talks with the west on European security and Ukraine fail to go its way, while warning the latest discussions with Nato were hitting a dead end.

In an apparent attempt to up the ante with the Biden administration, Sergei Ryabkov, who led Russia’s delegation in a meeting with the US on Monday, told Russian television he could neither confirm nor exclude sending military assets to Cuba and Venezuela if talks fail. Asked about these steps, he said “it all depends on the actions by our US counterparts”.

Meanwhile another senior Russian diplomat threatened unspecified “necessary measures” if Moscow’s security demands were not met.

This is all the poisonous fruit of the expansion of NATO started in the 1990s by Bill Clinton.

Clinton wanted additional markets for US defense contractors, and so he ignored the promises that were made when Germany was reunified.

The negative fallout from this, even US Boris Yeltsin, who literally had the US campaigning for his reelection in the mid 1990s, was outraged, so it was foreseeable that NATO expansion would come back to bite us in the tuchus. (Clinton also pressured Boeing to merge with McDonnell Douglas, screwed the poor with welfare reform, deregulated finance by repealing Glass Steagall, etc.)

In fact, it was foreseen, with George Kennan describing NATO expansion as a, "Strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions," in 1996.

The Americans want a market for our weapons and the Europeans want a European defense establishment, and neither of these have anything to do with the original purpose of NATO.

Maybe If They Showed an Interest in Building Planes

It turns out that one of the problems that Boeing has building planes is that their workforce is fleeing for the exit.

This is not a surprise.  Boeing has made it clear that they are in the business of manipulating their stock prices to benefit senior management, not building aircraft.

The repeated debacles, and the repeated outsourcing of core technologies, has made it clear that management does not value their technical expertise.

It's no wonder that they are leaving:

Boeing Co. will put its battered engineering reputation on the line again this week when its Starliner spacecraft blasts off from Florida with a load of supplies for the International Space Station.

The mission is a do-over of a 2019 trip that almost ended in calamity, and a dress rehearsal for the Boeing capsule's first flight with astronauts later this year. If successful, it would narrow the gap with an ascendant rival, SpaceX, and answer the latest space-faring feats by the billionaire founders of Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic.

A tour de force by Starliner might also help distract from a potential problem Boeing is facing back on earth: An exodus of some of the company's most experienced engineers that threatens its rebound from a bruising run that includes the grounding of its 737 Max jets after two fatal crashes and the plunge in global air travel amid the spread of Covid-19.

………

More than 3,200 engineers and technical workers have left the company’s Seattle airplane manufacturing hub since the start of last year, about 18% of the union that represents them, with only a scant number added behind. In all, Boeing is aiming to cut 23,000 employees — from its executive committee to the factory floor — through layoffs, buyouts and retirement initiatives it launched last year as it racked up record financial losses.

The engineers departed an employer that had shifted away from the bet-the-company ethos that gave the world the 747 jumbo jet and the Apollo era's Saturn rocket. Over the past decade, cost-obsessed Boeing executives wowed Wall Street by plowing more than $40 billion into share buybacks. The strategy made Boeing the best performer in the Dow Jones Industrial Average for a span, but left the manufacturer ill-prepared for leaner times and new competitive threats.  

The strategy made them unable, and unwilling to invest money in new products.

McDonnell, a company which had one [failed] civilian project in its whole history took over Boeing, and resulted in a company being run by finance guys, as opposed to engineers, and finance doesn't make anything, it just loots.

Until Boeing kicks the looters out, it will not find success.

"Checkmate Fighter Unveiled at MAKS Airshow

Note the sawtooth engine nozzle


Flight Show Pr0n Vids




And some stills as well

Aircraft black covers are very tempting, but we'd like you to focus on the details 😉#uac #rostec #maks2021 #checkmate pic.twitter.com/32rjELw4KN

— Rostec Сorporation (@Rostec_Russia) July 17, 2021

And a reveal from the manufacturer


By comparison, the proposed Boeing F-32

The new Russian lightweight fighter has finally been unveiled, and UAC has dubbed it "Checkmate", probably with an eventual designation of Su-75.  (That is the Bort number on the aircraft)

My thoughts on this are as follows:

• It looks a lot like what the production version of Boeing JSF competitor was supposed to look like, only with a 2-post V-tail, as opposed to a 4-post tail. (Boeing considered the 2-post tail, but dropped it as being too risky).
• It's a lot more slender than the Boeing JSF proposal, probably because it doesn't have to accommodate a STO/VL system.
• It probably won't be as crippled in its air to air weapons load out as the F-35, because the Russians are not trying to save a disastrously over budget and over schedule program, as the USAF was with the F-22. 
• I wonder if there will be a retractable screen in the inlet, as the Mig-29 had, to deal with rough field conditions. (It might not be necessary with the front wheel well behind the inlet)
• The cockpit looks very similar to that of the Su-57, which makes sense, because it simplifies training and maintenance for any air force operating both aircraft.
• The fact that they are pushing the name "Checkmate" hard probably has to do with their dissatisfaction at the NATO designators used in the west. (The Su-57 is called the "Felon" by NATO)
• The side bays appear to be able to carry a single a long range AAM, or perhaps 2 short/median range AAMs each.  There may also be a ventral bay.
• It should be noted that the Boeing proposal was widely reported to have outperformed what became the F-35, with the exception of STO/VL performance, which is what drove the decision. 
• I have not spotted a cannon, but I would be shocked if there is not one.
• It appears that the design falls on the side of agility as opposed to absolutely maximizing stealth.
• It appears that it will use the same engine as the Su-57, in the 35 tonne class, as opposed to the 40 tonne class used by the F-35, implying that it is a bit smaller.
• It appears to have lower wing loading, and hence probably more agility, than the F-35.
  

Hopefully, we will get a few more details over the next few days:

The new Russian single-engine fighter in the F-35 class—a field that is getting crowded—echoes designs dating back to the Joint Strike Fighter competition of the 1990s; ironically, borrowing most from the two concepts that lost that contest.

The Checkmate fighter from Sukhoi is to be officially unveiled at the MAKS airshow near Moscow on July 20, but leaked photos of a mockup in the exhibit hall, and fast-edited clips from promotional videos released by Russia’s United Aircraft Corp., appeared on the internet in the last few days.

The images show an aircraft with a large angular chin inlet reminiscent of Boeing’s X-32 contender in the JSF contest ultimately won by Lockheed Martin’s F-35 and also on China’s J-10B.

Checkmate also seems to have a short, clipped delta wing, which does not extend to the tail; again, like the X-32. The jet has two canted elevons rather than a standard empennage of stabilizers and elevators, harkening to both the X-32 and McDonnell Douglas’s JSF entrant, as well as to the YF-23 on which McDonnell Douglas was partnered with Northrop. The YF-23 lost out to the Lockheed Martin F-22 in the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition, and McDonnell Douglas’s loss in the must-win JSF contest was a major factor in the company’s 1996 merger with Boeing.

The new fighter’s tail arrangement offers reduced radar cross section—with a lower profile and fewer tail surfaces to harmonize with other aircraft edges—as well as potentially high agility. A chine beginning on the jet’s nose and inlet becomes a shallow leading edge root extension (LERX).   

Like its larger Su-57 stablemate, the Checkmate has a bubble canopy that slides back, and its infrared search and track feature is mounted on the windscreen, as it is on all recent MiG and Sukhoi fighters. However, UAC has shown images online in recent weeks of a faceted electro-optical aperture like the F-35’s, seemingly mounted on the underside of an aircraft. Other images that have circulated on the internet showing portions of the Checkmate have revealed sawtooth edges on the otherwise round exhaust, very similar to those on the F-35’s F135 engine.

I'm not sure that I have much to add at this time, except that I am getting a serious jet fighter geek on right now.

 

Boeing Still Can't Make Planes

The FAA will audit Boeing following the discovery of a serious manufacturing flaw.

The short version of this is that Boeing has systematically dismantled procedures to allow employees to report safety issues on the shop floor to senior management, because the management fetishist MBA culture that was imported from McDonnell Douglas when they acquired the firm.

Since McDonnell took over Boeing with Boeing's money, they have systematically dismantled every advantage that Boeing once they came on board:

Boeing Co. is facing an audit to determine why changes in its manufacturing practices on the 737 Max led to a hazard that went unnoticed for almost two years.

The Federal Aviation Administration, which oversees Boeing and has meted out multiple civil penalties against the planemaker in recent years, said in a statement Thursday that it is also investigating the origin of the manufacturing flaw.

“These initiatives are part of our commitment to continually evaluating and improving our oversight of all aspects of aviation safety, recognizing that catching errors at the earliest possible point enhances what is already the world’s safest form of transportation,” the agency said.

………

The flaws in the electrical components raise new questions about Boeing’s ability to monitor safety issues within the company. The lack of a robust internal safety review and oversight system was cited repeatedly by multiple reviews of the 737 Max crashes.

Until recent months, Boeing didn’t have what is known as a Safety Management System, which requires an organization to conduct more robust risk analyses of design features, open channels for employees to raise concerns and involve senior management.

………

The changes to how certain electrical components were installed on the 737 Max occurred in 2019. At the time, Boeing concluded it was such a minor change that it didn’t require FAA approval, the agency said in a statement. Similarly, Boeing employees who are deputized to act on behalf of the federal regulator also didn’t approve of the changes.

………

The electrical problem was deemed serious enough that the agency said it was waiving the normal period for public comment and would require the repairs as soon as Boeing completes a bulletin detailing them.

Boeing is being run by finance guys, and their business model is tor burn the the company down for the insurance money.

Boeing Still Unable to Manufacture Aircraft

They are screwing up a critical structural joint on the 787 down in their union busting facility in South Carolina.

This is not a surprise.  They went there to treat employees like crap, and they have had problems, the the facility for a very long time, to the degree that some of the employees in the North Charleston facility saying that they would refuse to fly in a plane made there:

Boeing earlier this week instructed airlines to pull a batch of eight recently-manufactured 787 Dreamliners from service, prompting their immediate grounding, after the plane maker determined that a manufacturing issue undermined the strength of an area of the jet’s carbon fiber composite structure.

So far, eight 787s — all built in the last few years — have been withdrawn from flying. Aircraft for United Airlines, Singapore Airlines and Air Canada are impacted by the impromptu grounding, according to a person familiar with the situation.

According to those familiar with the issue, an area of the structure in the rear of the aircraft is unable to withstand the maximum stress that would be experienced by the aircraft in service and could fail.

By, "Could fail," they mean a failure in flight leading to a depressurization incident, and possibly an inflight breakup.

………

This new issue is the first publicly known instance in the jet’s nine year service life that a structural defect with its mostly carbon fiber airframe has caused Boeing to immediately withdraw 787s from service. The 787 fleet was grounded for three months in 2013 following the overheating of lithium-ion batteries. At that point, the global cadre of 787s was just 50 airplanes and the jet returned to operation after the company developed a new containment and venting system for the main and auxiliary power unit batteries inside the jet’s electronics bay.

The source of the newly-discovered structural issue has been traced to a mating point inside the aft fuselage between two carbon fiber composite barrels, known as Section 47/48 where the two barrels meet with a large bulkhead that caps the pressurized cabin. The pieces are fabricated and joined with the aft pressure bulkhead at Boeing’s North Charleston, S.C. plant and then delivered for final assembly to the company’s nearby final assembly building or flown to Everett, Wash.

………


The first of the two issues causing the issue centers on how naturally occurring gaps in the structure are filled with shims that ensure stresses on the airframe are carried as they’re designed. Boeing has used a predictive shimming technology on the 787 program for more than a decade, robotically laser scanning the surfaces around the structural joins to automatically generate the required shims to fill the gaps.

In the case of the eight withdrawn aircraft, the gaps were improperly filled. On their own, that might not produce an immediate issue, but Boeing said a second manufacturing issue has prompted the pulling of the jets. The second issue centers on the inner skin of the large monolithic composite barrels. On the suspect aircraft, the skin of the woven carbon fiber fuselage is “supposed to be smooth enough so there are no abrupt ridges,” said one person familiar with the issue.

………

When the gaps are improperly filled in combination with the roughness of the inner skin, the required structural strength does not meet the limit load requirement. Limit load is the maximum expected stress the aircraft would ever expect to experience in service. While limit load is not solely an airline service requirement, every commercial aircraft test program has to demonstrate an aircraft’s structure is designed for limit loads before it can be safely cleared to fly for the first time.

………

Over the longer term, the gaps left by improper shimming can put added stress at certain points in the structure that can cause unexpected fatigue cracks to develop and propagate. The Boeing spokesman said its engineers “are analyzing data on the in-service fleet to determine if action is required, potentially including more frequent inspection or rework. It could also be determined that no further action is required if the condition is found to not impact the longevity of the structure.”

………

A spokesman for the FAA said that the U.S. aviation regulator “is aware of the matter and continues to engage with Boeing,” according to a single-sentence statement.

………

Installation of the shims across the 787s structure have been a recurring challenge for Boeing. Prior to the 787s entry into service, in June 2010, improperly shimmed horizontal stabilizers temporarily grounded Boeing’s test fleet. And the issue, according to several Boeing manufacturing engineers and aircraft assemblers familiar with the situation say the structural shimming has been a longstanding challenge for the company’s South Carolina manufacturing operation.


“Don’t get me wrong, it’s hard to do,” said one engineer. “But they are so hellbent on making rate, sometimes engineering and production aren’t aligned.” In 2012, early in the 787’s production run, Boeing found more than a dozen improperly shimmed longerons, structural stiffeners, inside the same 47/48 section requiring inspections and localized repairs for structural delamination.

………

The recurrence of shimming issues on the Dreamliner program comes as Boeing is considering consolidating 787 final assembly operations exclusively to South Carolina. The North Charleston, S.C. factory that produces the aft fuselage where the structural issue was introduced builds the section regardless of where final assembly is completed.

Shorter Boeing, "Our South Carolina facility is not executing properly, but because we are in a right-to-work state, we can push them to assemble dangerous aircraft and hit the production numbers that we want, so we want to move more production to South Carolina."

This can't but help Airbus, because, even if Boeing is a superior aircraft, you are wiping out a decade of advantages with a two week grounding.

Boeing's upper management has been taken over by former McDonnell and finance types, and they are completely unable to manufacture an aircraft for a civil environment.

Linkage

• 315 billion-tonne iceberg breaks off Antarctica (BBC) You arrogant ass, you killed us!
• Autonomous Weapons Need Autonomous Lawyers (The Air Force JAG Corps Reporter) If this does not terrify you, you are not paying attention.
• How Bill Clinton and American Financiers Armed China (Matt Stoller) How the Clinton administration's attempt to rescue McDonnell Douglas led to the Chinese getting sensitive sensitive technology, as well as its merger with Boeing.
• Announcing the First Winner of the Archie McCardell Award for Truly Horrendous Management: WeWork (naked capitalism) Archie McCardell destroyed International Harvester, and is generally considered one of the worst CEOs ever.
• How Joe Biden Empowered China's Censorship of the NBA (Matt Stoller) It was an artifact of the Obama administration's efforts, largely led by Biden, to create an opening for US films in China.
• Beware the digital Stasi in your pocket (Financial Times) Your smart phone is spying on you.

This take-down of Australian mining billionaire, abusive employer, and wannabee politician, Clive Parker, is a true thing of beauty. Watch the whole thing:

Linkage

• Kamala Harris Stopped Cooperation With San Francisco Church Sex Abuse Victims (The Intercept) To the degree that the past is prologue, this does not bode well.
• Reining in CEO compensation and curbing the rise of inequality (Economic Policy Institute) "This paper argues for the desirability of reining in CEO pay and discusses policy strategies that could be part of such an effort."
• How Boeing Bean-Counters Courted the 737 MAX Disaster (Daily Beast) Also notes the direct line from McDonnell's took over Boeing (with Boeing's money) and how this led to a toxic culture.
• A Moment of Silence: The case for keeping new organizers offline. (The South Lawn) Makes a cogent argument that novice political organizers should stay far away from the internet or social media.
• Micropayments-for-news pioneer Blendle is pivoting from micropayments (Nieman Journalism Lab) They could not make money on a pay for articles, so they have moved to premium subscriptions.
• London Celebrates The Monty Python Reunion By Putting A 50-Foot Dead Parrot In Potters Field Park (Fast Company) From 5 years ago, but too good to ignore.
• 2,500 years ago, these folks weren't cremated – but their funeral-goers were absolutely baked: Earliest evidence of pot smoking discovered (The Register) Oldest evidence of marijuana smoking.  No Fig Newtons here though.

Pining for the fjords:

Boeing Cannot Design Planes Anymore

As a result of years of layoffs and retirements of staff, Boeing lacked the technical resources to make a credible bid for the new Air Force Trainer:

It seemed so all-American: a U.S. aviation giant unveiling its newest military jet to flashing lights and thumping heavy-metal music. But the sleek twin-tailed T-X — Boeing’s candidate to become the U.S. Air Force’s next pilot trainer — couldn’t have made it to the dolled-up St. Louis hangar without a good deal of international help.

For all its deep aviation heritage, the Chicago company needed a partner on the T-X bid. A decade of engineering layoffs had left the venerable American firm without the workers needed to add the trainer competition to its existing workload, particularly with the Air Force requiring demonstration aircraft with a relatively quick turnaround. It also needed a way to do it more cheaply than past endeavors.

So the maker of the F-15 Eagle and F/A-18 Super Hornet teamed up with Saab — builder of the Gripen 4.5-generation fighter jet — to develop a T-X candidate. And less than three years after the two firms announced their partnership, they have now unveiled their first two aircraft, which are expected to fly by year’s end. That’s pretty fast for an American defense firm.

While officials from neither company would say just what parts of the plane were developed in Europe, Saab is believed to be manufacturing large portions of it. In June, a large Russian cargo plane believed to be carrying sections of the new aircraft flew from Sweden to the U.S.

………

“I’m not saying this thing is doomed. It’s just that I’m uncomfortable with a big disconnect between engineering and design and manufacturing,” said Richard Aboulafia, vice president for analysis at the Virginia-based Teal Group consulting firm. “It adds risk, it gets rid of a core company advantage, and frankly, there are just huge advantages of having designers and manufacturers co-located.”

Aboulafia cited Boeing’s need to lean on its partner for engineering.

“Outsourcing design — that appears to have a lot more complications than benefits,” he said. “It adds risk and it gets rid of a core capability, a core differentiator.”

I would note here that Boeing has outsourced technical expertise on the civil side as well, with many of the stumbles in 787 development coming from the fact that critical engineering expertise was outsourced to, "risk sharing partners."

It is a clear indictment of the McDonnell Douglas MBA style management that Boeing has had for the past few decades.

Boeing can no longer design and build new aircraft.

A 23 Year Long Multi-Billion Dollar Long Contract Dispute Settled

And, surprise, surprise, it is a sweetheart deal for the defense contractors: (paid subscription required)

After more than two decades and numerous attempts at a settlement, the U.S. government finally agreed to accept $400 million from General Dynamics and Boeing in the dispute over the Navy's cancellation of the $4.8 billion A-12 Avenger II program.

The settlement is a fraction of what the government sought when the lawsuit began, demanding $1.3 billion in restitution ($2.2 billion in 2014 dollars) for money spent on the stealthy carrier-based aircraft program that had yet to deliver an aircraft. And it is even smaller when compared with an agreement for $2.9 billion that was nearly negotiated in 2003.

………

The Navy will receive three EA-18G Growlers that will be delivered on top of the 21 Boeing aircraft that were funded by Congress for fiscal 2014 and are expected to be delivered in 2016, according to the Navy.

General Dynamics will provide $198 million in credits to the Navy toward the design, construction and delivery portions of the Zumwalt-class DDG-1000 destroyer.

………

The dispute began in 1991, when then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney canceled the $4.8 billion stealth attack aircraft, run by General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas, which has since been acquired by Boeing. It was terminated in part due to the government's conclusion that contractors were not meeting cost and schedule targets. The Navy demanded that contractors repay $1.3 billion to the government.

The prime contractors sued the government, arguing the government should make penalty payments because the contract was canceled for “convenience,” not a failure to perform. The case festered in the court system, eventually reaching the Supreme Court.

………

In 2011, 20 years after the start of the dispute, the Supreme Court considered the case. The Navy argued that the contractors had not completed the work they had promised. The contractors argued that the government held back classified information about stealth technology that hampered their effectiveness. Ultimately, the Supreme Court sent the case back to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, where it remained until now.

They met none of their technical requirements, they missed their schedule, and they were hideously over budget, and the punishment for the (now effectively admitted with the settlement) misfeasance and malfeasance is that the contractors get to secure the status of existing programs.

Boeing 787 Faces More Battery Problems

Bummer of a birth mark, Boeing

They have found swelling in another 787 battery:

Cells in a second lithium-ion battery on a Boeing Co 787 Dreamliner forced to make an emergency landing in Japan last month showed slight swelling, a Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) official said on Tuesday.

The jet, flown by All Nippon Airways Co, was forced to make the landing after its main battery failed.

“I do not know the exact discussion taken by the research group on the ground, but I heard that it is a slight swelling (in the auxiliary power unit battery cells). I have so far not heard that there was internal damage,” Masahiro Kudo, a senior accident investigator at the JTSB said in a briefing in Tokyo.

Kudo said that two out of eight cells in the second battery unit showed some bumps and the JTSB would continue to investigate to determine whether this was irregular or not.

Ummmm....I spent a few months working for a battery manufacturer. This is not a good sign.

Boeing purchasing McDonnell Douglas, and deciding to let McDonnell Douglas's failed management then take over the firm is bearing bitter fruit.

787 Finally Delivered

Only 3 years late:

Boeing's long-awaited dream machine became a commercial reality on Sunday when the lightweight plastic-composites 787 Dreamliner was formally delivered to its first Japanese customer.

Boeing says the revolutionary carbon fiber design will hand 20 percent fuel savings to airlines struggling to avoid a new recession, and give passengers a more comfortable ride with better cabin air and large electronically dimmable windows.

The first $200 million aircraft was handed over to Japanese carrier All Nippon Airways three years behind schedule after persistent delays that cost Boeing billions of dollars.

"It took a lot of hard work to get to this day," said Scott Fancher, vice president and general manager of the 787 program, at the outset of two days of celebrations at the plane's Seattle production plant.

The blue and white-painted long-range aircraft, which boasts a graceful new design with raked wingtips, will leave for Japan on Tuesday and enter service domestically on Oct. 26.

Boeing has taken orders for 821 Dreamliners, which will compete with the future Airbus A350, due in 2013.

FWIW, Airbus is likely to be late with the A350, that's the way of such endeavors, but it is unlikely to be as late, because EADS is not determined to shift all of its expertise to poorly supervised outside firms in order to hit quarterly numbers.

Additionally, EADS has had nearly a decade to watch the missteps Boeing made in implementing the advanced technology of the aircraft, and so should be able to avoid some of them. (You know, little things like not having enough of the proper fasteners available).

Boeing, after having taken over McDonnell Douglas, after the path taken by that company, single source "risk bearing partners", made them irrelevant in commercial aviation, decided to traipse down the same insane path.

EADS, by virtue of being what amounts a national champion in aerospace for the EU, cannot take this path, and so its ability to completely f%$# things up is somewhat more limited.

Meow!!!!!

Pass the Popcorn

So, Lockheed-Martin, on a plane that is not really in production yet, and one for whom the cost numbers are very fluid, decided to call out the McDonnell Douglas Boeing F/A-18 E/F by name on operating costs, and Boeing's response was, "Oh no you didn't bitch!".

We now have a contractor cat fight:

Lockheed Martin is peddling untruths about the relative cost of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the Super Hornet, according to Boeing Military Aircraft president Chris Chadwick.

In a Tuesday morning teleconference, Chadwick not only called Lockheed Martin's claims "fundamentally untrue" but named business development vice-president Steve O'Bryan as the source, and the fact that the claims were denied formally also points to a developing war between the two programs.

The offending statement, quoted in Air Force Magazine's Daily Report last week (here, search for May 26), claimed that a fully operational F-16E or F/A-18E would be "the same cost" as an F-35 at maturity, around $65 million in 2010 dollars. Not so, Chadwick says, claiming a comparable (recurring flyaway) cost of $53 million for a Super Hornet -- including a set of external tanks, an ATFLIR targeting pod and "working" helmet mounted displays.

Any F-35 cost figure, Chadwick pointed out, "is an estimate based on numbers of unsold aircraft."

Moreover, Chadwick added, current figures show that the JSF -- even in its F-35A variant -- will cost more to operate than the Super Hornet. Citing a $16,400 cost-per-hour F-35A estimate (in 2002 dollars) in the latest Selected Acquisition Report, Chadwick says that a comparable number for the Super Hornet is $12,200 -- less than either the F/A-18C/D or the F-16C/D.

Cat fight!

Though I would note that the F-16, should be cheaper than both to operate, and it should get you there quicker than both too, at least until calling bingo fuel.

Buck Foeing

The National Labor Relations Board has Boeing locating the 2^nd assembly line for the 787 in South Carolina was part of illegal union busting activity:

Boeing illegally put its second 787 Dreamliner assembly line in South Carolina in retaliation for strikes in Washington and should be required to build the line in Washington, according to a potentially groundbreaking National Labor Relations Board complaint (pdf) filed Wednesday.

NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon filed the complaint after investigating a charge that the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers union District 751, bargaining unit, backed by the national union, filed on March 29, 2010. A board administrative law judge is scheduled to hear the case on June 14.

Seriously, since Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas, and the failed McDonnell Douglas management team ended up running the company, they have consistently failed in ways that stun me.

First, they were big enough assholes that they got engineers to go out on strike and stay on strike, then they f%$#ed up the bidding on the next gen tanker twice (the first time was when they bribed an official to cut them an unconscionable lease deal), and now they have been so arrogant to get the normally hapless NLRB to unload a can of whup ass on then.

If I were a Boeing shareholder, I would be agitating to make sure that no one who ever worked at M-D from holding a senior management position at the Everett Chicago based airframe manufacturer.