After all, if you are looking for something smaller and lighter than existing systems, you still have a box on treads.
That being said, there are some lessons learned here, and hopefully they will be fixed:
- There was too much focus on commonality among vehicles. If you want a tank(ette) version, there is no reason to put it on the same wheelbase as an infantry combat vehicle or command vehicle. The M8 Armored Gun System, which I saw up close in my time at BAE systems,* was much smaller and lighter, and had a lower height, and hence better concealment. Going with a completely common platform costs more than you save.
- Abandon the lead system integrator (LSI) concept of program development. This contracting concept has failed EVERY time it has been used, and there are already bills out there to ban the practice. It gives lunatics (defense contractors) the keys to the asylum.
- A better understanding on what the program is for. On the FCS-MGV, for example GD was responsible for propulsion and suspension, and BAE Systems was responsible for the track, not because of any special technical abilities of the respective companies, but because of a deliberate policy to spread the money around evenly.
- Implement technologies that are more mature.
*Full disclosure, I worked on the Future Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle, FRMV, "wrecker" variant of the FCS-MGV† from 2003-2006 at United Defense (later BAE Systems after the Carlyle Group sold me to buy Dunkin Donuts).
†Future Combat Systems-Manned Ground Vehicle. These are the ones that are the tanks and APCs. As opposed to the various unnmanned vehicles, networking technologies, etc. that form the full FCS along with the MGVs.‡
‡Yes, I have worked everywhere. Maybe I can't hold down a job, but more likely this has been my role as "technical hit man", where you are parachuted in to take care of a specific need.
0 comments :
Post a Comment